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Abstract Many distributional conflicts are characterized by the presence of acquired
rights. The basic structure of these conflicts is that of the so-called claims problem, in
which an amount of money has to be divided among individuals with differing claims
and the total amount available falls short of the sum of the claims. We describe the
results of a questionnaire in which Belgian and German students were confronted with
nine claims problems. In the “Firm” version, respondents had to divide revenue among
the owners of a firm who contribute to the activities of the firm in different degrees.
In the “Pensions” version, they had to divide tax money among pensioners who have
paid different contributions during their active career. Responses in the Pensions ver-
sion are more egalitarian than in the Firm version. For both versions, the proportional
rule performs very well in describing the choices of the respondents. Other prominent
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rules—in particular the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules—
fail to capture some basic intuitions. A substantial part of the respondents tend to
become more progressive as the amount to be distributed decreases other things equal,
and tend to become more progressive as the inequality in the distribution of claims
becomes more unequal other things equal. All of these conclusions are robust with
respect to the difference in home-country of the respondents.
1 Introduction
Many distributional conflicts in the real world are characterized by the presence of
acquired rights. In some cases the legal system has worked out specific rules about
how to settle these conflicts: examples are to be found in the sphere of bankruptcy
or inheritance legislation. In other cases, however, there is no clear-cut legal solution.
Important recent examples of this situation are to be found in the areas of social policy
(how to cut social benefits if the budget turns out to be too low to keep all promises?)
and of wage policies within a firm (which form of wage moderation is most acceptable
when such moderation is made necessary by economic circumstances?). Although the
legal status of the acquired rights therefore may differ considerably in different situ-
ations, all the problems mentioned before have the same basic theoretical structure.
This structure can be described as follows: how ought an amount of money to be
distributed among a group of individuals if these individuals have differing acquired
rights, i.e., different prior claims with respect to the money, and the amount available
for distribution falls short of the sum of these claims?
Psychological feelings of justice and injustice seem to be particularly strong when
acquired rights are at stake. Social reactions may then have a considerable impact on
the decisions taken and on their economic consequences. Of course, in actual practice,
distributional conflicts are settled within a set of well-structured (legal, political, and
social) institutions. Moreover, the economic agents involved in the negotiations usu-
ally are driven by self-interest and influenced by specific events and promises made
in the past. These specific circumstances can only be recovered by detailed empirical
research. Yet at the same time, at a more abstract level deeper ethical intuitions may
also play a role. These may determine whether specific distributional solutions are in
the end acceptable to the parties. They are certainly crucial for the agents that have to
arbitrate in these conflicts and that in general have no immediate self-interest in the
distributional conflict. It is therefore interesting to investigate the structure of these
underlying ethical intuitions.
There is by now a large and rapidly growing theoretical literature on this prob-
lem—referred to as the “claims problem”, “the bankruptcy problem”, or the problem
of “estate division”.1 Formally, each claims problem is completely defined by two
characteristics, viz., the vector of claims and the amount to be distributed. The litera-
ture focuses to a large extent on the axiomatic examination of rules, which associate
with every claims problem a division of the amount of money among the individuals.
Many of the axioms proposed in the literature have ethical content, which implies
1 For overviews of this literature, see Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003).
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that the rules they characterize are open to interpersonal disagreement. The question
thus arises to what degree these various axioms (and therefore the various distribution
rules) are found attractive by empirical subjects in solving concrete claims problems.
Questionnaire studies may give interesting insights into this question of the empirical
acceptance of various ethical theories.2 The results of these studies are not only rele-
vant from a normative point of view. Investigation of the acceptance of the theoretical
axioms may also offer a structured approach to explain why specific decisions are
taken in the real-world examples described before.
The theoretical literature makes abstraction from the particular economic context in
which the problem is situated. Knowledge of the basic characteristics of the problem,
i.e., the vector of claims and the amount to be distributed, is sufficient to determine
the solution. Unambiguous adherence to a rule implies that it is consistently applied
to all claims problems. This is a strong requirement, as it might be possible that the
acceptance of the ethical axioms is to some degree dependent on the level of the
respective claims or on the amount to be distributed. Moreover, if rules are to be
applied in practice, then the particular economic context is likely to be important as
well, as it influences the ethical status of the characteristics of the claims problem.
Therefore, from an empirical perspective, the following two questions appear to be
of importance. (1) Within-context consistency: for a given economic context, to what
degree do people use the same rule for different claims problems, i.e., claims problems
with different claims vectors and/or available money amounts? (2) Between-context
uniformity: for a given claims problem, to what degree do people propose the same
division for different economic contexts?
Previous questionnaire studies on the claims problem have mainly focused on the
question of between-context uniformity. Schokkaert and Overlaet (1989) confronted
respondents with several versions of a claims problem. The formal characteristics of
their claims problem are the same across versions, but the reason for the differences
in claims varies, e.g., in one version claims reflect differences in hours worked while
in another version claims reflect differences in talent. Béhue (2003) and Herrero et
al. (2006) framed a given claims problem in different settings, viz, the bankruptcy,
inheritance, and taxation settings. All the three studies find that the specific economic
context significantly affects which divisions are favoured by the respondents. In con-
trast to the question of between-context uniformity, within-context consistency has
received only modest attention so far. Béhue (2003) and Gächter and Riedl (2006)
consider this question, but in neither study it is the main focus.3 Both studies compare
only a small number of different claims problems (3 and 2, respectively).
In this paper, we deal with both the question of within-context consistency and
between-context uniformity. The former question is tackled by consideration of a wide
variety of claims problems (9 in total), which are all presented to each respondent, and
2 There is an increasing interest in economics in the empirical study of the acceptance of theories of
distributive justice. See Konow (2003) and Schokkaert (1999) for overviews of this literature.
3 The main contribution of the study by Gächter and Riedl (2006) is that, in addition to a questionnaire
approach, it uses an experimental approach with actual negotiations. Herrero et al. (2006) also consider
both questionnaire and experimental results.
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by giving special attention to individual-level data. The question of between-context
uniformity is dealt with by using two versions of the questionnaire with the same
claims problems—in the Firm version, three firm owners have to distribute a loss, and
in the Pensions version, a shortage in funds has to be distributed over three pensioners.
We tried to formulate socially relevant problems, so that our results may contribute to
understanding real-world issues. Moreover, we tried to avoid situations in which there
is a well-defined legal solution to the distributional conflict, as this might influence
strongly the answers of the respondents. In the discussion of the results, we will focus
especially on the question of how respondents vary tolerance for inequality under vari-
ations of the characteristics of the claims problem and of the economic context. We
organized the survey in two different countries, Belgium and Germany, in both cases
using student samples. A priori one would not expect large differences in the attitudes
of Belgian and German students: our results therefore offer a test of the robustness of
the methodology.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we present several rules and introduce
our conceptualization of tolerance for inequality. Section 3 discusses the setup of our
questionnaire. In Sect. 4, the results of the questionnaire are presented and discussed.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
An amount E ∈ R+ has to be divided among a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of individuals
with claims adding up to more than E . Let ci ∈ R+ denote individual i’s claim and
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) the claims vector. Claims are ordered so that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn .
The total claim
∑
i∈N ci is assumed to be positive and is denoted by C . A claims
problem is a pair (c, E) with C ≥ E . The set C collects all claims problems.
The literature on claims problems focuses on rules, which recommend for each
claims problem a division between the individuals of the amount to divide. Formally,
a rule is a function R that associates with each claims problem (c, E) ∈ C a division
R(c, E) = (R1(c, E), R2(c, E), . . . , Rn(c, E)) ∈ Rn+. We refer to Ri (c, E) as indi-
vidual i’s award and to R(c, E) as the awards vector. The difference ci − Ri (c, E)
is said to be individual i’s loss. Awards vector are assumed to satisfy the following
three conditions. (1) Efficiency: the sum of the awards equals the amount to divide. (2)
Nonnegativity and claims boundedness: no individual receives an award smaller than
zero or greater than her claim. (3) Order preservation: if individual i’s claim is at least
as great as individual j’s claim, then i’s award is at least as great as j’s award, and
i’s loss is at least as great as j’s loss. We accept these three conditions as part of the
definition of a rule. They have real ethical content however, and are not necessarily
innocuous when analysing opinions.
One of the objectives in the discussion of our questionnaire results will be to com-
pare how well eight of the best-known rules for solving claims problems explain the
choices of the respondents. The three oldest and most prominent rules are the propor-
tional, constrained equal awards, and constrained equal losses rules.
The proportional rule already played a central role in Aristotle’s theory of justice
(Young 1994, pp. 64–65). The rule makes awards proportional to claims.
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Proportional rule, P. For all (c, E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N , we have Pi (c, E) = EC ci .
The constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules both implement
the idea of equality, be it in very different ways. Both rules were already discussed
by Maimonides in the twelfth century (Aumann and Maschler 1985). The constrained
equal awards rule equalizes awards under the constraint that no individual receives an
award that exceeds her claim.
Constrained equal awards rule, CEA. For all (c, E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N , we have
C E Ai (c, E) = min {ci , λ} where λ ∈ R+ is chosen so as to achieve efficiency.
An awards vector for the constrained equal awards rule typically looks like
(c1, c2, . . . , ck, λ, λ, . . . , λ).
The constrained equal losses rule equalizes losses under the constraint that no indi-
vidual receives a negative award.
Constrained equal losses rule, CEL. For all (c, E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N , we have
CELi (c, E) = max {0, ci − λ} where λ ∈ R is chosen so as to achieve efficiency.
An awards vector for the constrained equal losses rule typically looks like (0, 0, . . . ,
0, ck − λ, ck+1 − λ, . . . , cn − λ).
Appendix A defines the five remaining rules: the Talmud (T), Piniles’ (Pin), con-
strained egalitarian (CE), random arrival (RA), and minimal overlap (MO) rules. For
a detailed discussion of the eight rules and their properties, we refer to the overview
of the literature by Thomson (2003).
Several of these eight rules have been characterized in terms of formal axioms.
But the rules also imply different attitudes to inequality, an aspect that may play an
important role in the opinions of lay observers. It certainly is crucial in discussions
about acquired rights in the real world. We shall pay special attention to this feature
in discussing our results.
We make inequality comparisons using the Lorenz dominance relation, the cor-
nerstone of the literature on inequality measurement.4 Let x, y ∈ Rn+ be two awards
vectors proposed for the same claims problem—this implies that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn ,
y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤ yn , and ∑ni=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 yi . We say that x Lorenz dominates y if∑k
i=1 xi ≥
∑k
i=1 yi for all k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, with at least one inequality holding
strictly. Note that x Lorenz dominates y if and only if x can be obtained from y by
transferring money from individuals with higher awards to individuals with lower
awards.5 The vector x is understood to be less unequal than the vector y.6
Consider Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, which present the solutions proposed
by the various rules for the nine claims problems used in our questionnaire. As we
4 See Sen and Foster (1997) for an overview of this literature.
5 See, e.g., Sen and Foster (1997, pp. 54–55).
6 It does not follow that x is preferable to y as a solution to the given claims problem. Statements concern-
ing Lorenz dominance are statements about inequality and not about ethical preferability. The particular
economic context determines the extent to which inequality in claims ought to translate into inequality in
awards. In Sect. 4.1, we will see that respondents indeed prefer different degrees of inequality in awards
depending on the economic context.
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Fig. 1 Lorenz comparisons of eight rules. An arrow (or a sequence of arrows) from rule R to rule R′
indicates that, for each (c, E) ∈ C , either R(c, E) = R′(c, E), or R(c, E) Lorenz dominates R′(c, E). The
absence of an arrow (or of a sequence of arrows) indicates the absence of such a general Lorenz relationship
move downward in a table, we move to awards vectors that are more unequal in the
Lorenz sense. Indeed, for any two awards vectors, the upper one is obtained from the
lower one by transferring money from individuals with higher awards to individuals
with lower awards. The examples in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 reveal some
regularities. For instance, in all tables, the proportional division is at least as unequal
as the Piniles’ and constrained egalitarian divisions, and the minimal overlap division
is at least as unequal as the Talmud and random arrival divisions. Some such inequality
relationships between rules hold for every possible claims problem. Figure 1 presents
these general Lorenz relationships. See Bosmans and Lauwers (2007) for proofs.7
The three prominent rules constitute benchmark cases with respect to equality
preference, or progressivity. They imply a uniform attitude in terms of progressivity
irrespective of the specific characteristics of the claims problem at hand. The con-
strained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules are at the two extremes. The
former always selects the least unequal awards vector available for any rule, while
the latter always selects the most unequal awards vector available for any rule.8 The
proportional rule is neutral in terms of progressivity. Indeed, the literature on inequal-
ity measurement regards vectors which are proportional to one another as equally
unequal. By consequence, the proportional rule preserves the inequality in the claims
because it makes the awards vector proportional to the claims vector.9
In contrast to the three prominent rules, the behaviour of the other five rules with
respect to progressivity is not so clear-cut. These rules do not behave in the same
way with regard to progressivity for all claims problems. For instance, the constrained
egalitarian rule is maximally progressive for the claims problem in Table 3, but neutral
in terms of progressivity for the claims problem in Table 4. Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10 and 11 yield similar examples for the remaining four rules.
3 The setup of the questionnaire
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to state their preferred awards vector
for nine different claims problems, which are presented in Table 1. Each of the nine
7 Related results are presented by Hougaard and Thorlund-Petersen (2001), Moreno-Ternero and Villar
(2006), and Thomson (2008).
8 This result is well known in the literature. For a proof, see, e.g., Hougaard and Thorlund-Petersen (2001)
or Bosmans and Lauwers (2007).
9 Ju and Moreno-Ternero (2008) consider inequality comparisons between the claims vector of a problem
and the awards vector proposed as a solution to that problem.
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Table 1 The questions, all
amounts in euros Question 1 c = (1,500, 2,000, 2,500) E = 4,500
Question 2 c = (1,500, 2,000, 2,500) E = 3,000
Question 3 c = (1,500, 2,000, 2,500) E = 1,500
Question 4 c = (1,000, 2,000, 3,000) E = 4,500
Question 5 c = (1,000, 2,000, 3,000) E = 3,000
Question 6 c = (1,000, 2,000, 3,000) E = 1,500
Question 7 c = (500, 2,000, 3,500) E = 4,500
Question 8 c = (500, 2,000, 3,500) E = 3,000
Question 9 c = (500, 2,000, 3,500) E = 1,500
claims problems is a combination of one of three possible claims vectors and one of
three possible amounts to divide. The three possible claims vectors have the same
sum of claims, but differ in terms of inequality (in the Lorenz sense). We mention the
claims vectors in order of increasing inequality: (1,500, 2,000, 2,500), (1,000, 2,000,
3,000), and (500, 2,000, 3,500). The three possible amounts to divide, 4,500, 3,000,
and 1,500, are greater than, equal to, and smaller than the sum of the half-claims,
respectively.10 By using all nine combinations of these claims vectors and amounts to
divide in our questionnaire, we obtain data for a wide variety of claims problems. The
questionnaire design allows us to analyse the effect on responses of a change in the
amount to divide for a given claims vector (questions 1, 2, and 3; questions 4, 5, and 6;
questions 7, 8, and 9), as well as the effect of a change in claims inequality for a given
amount to divide (questions 1, 4, and 7; questions 2, 5, and 8; questions 3, 6, and 9).
For each of the nine questions, respondents were presented with a list of alternative
awards vectors to choose from. These lists of awards vectors are given in Tables 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. We emphasize that the information in the first two columns
of these tables (pertaining to which rules are consistent with each of the awards vec-
tors) was not presented to the respondents. To examine within-context consistency,
i.e., the degree to which respondents use the same rule for different claims problems,
the awards vectors selected by each of the rules defined in the previous section are
included in the lists of alternatives for every question.
In order to tackle the question of between-context uniformity, i.e., the question
of how the economic context in which the claims problems are presented affects
responses, we consider two versions of the questionnaire with the same nine claims
problems, but with different background stories. Each respondent gets only one version
of the questionnaire. The questions in the “Firm” version are formulated as follows
(here we consider question 1):
Persons A, B, and C own a firm together. A, B, and C contribute to the activities
of the firm in different degrees, and for this reason they have agreed that their
salaries differ. They receive monthlye1,500,e2,000, ande2,500, respectively.
10 As is made clear in Appendix A, the position of the amount to divide relative to the sum of the half-claims
is an important reference point in the definition of the Talmud, Piniles’, and constrained egalitarian rules. It
is also important in comparing the progressivity of the various rules: see Hougaard and Thorlund-Petersen
(2001) and Bosmans and Lauwers (2007).
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Each of the three persons has also other sources of income. Due to an unexpected
deterioration of the economic circumstances, the part of the revenue of the firm
that can be used for salaries in a certain month amounts to only e4,500, not
enough to compensate the three firm directors. What is in your view the most
just distribution of the sum of e4,500 among persons A, B, and C?
In the “Pensions” version, the questions were formulated as follows (we again
consider question 1):
Persons A, B, and C go on retirement. On the basis of the contributions they have
paid during their active career, they are entitled to a monthly pension ofe1,500,
e2,000, ande2,500, respectively. Due to the demographic ageing, these pension
amounts can no longer be paid. The government only has e4,500 monthly to
spend on the pensions of A, B, and C. What is in your view the most just distri-
bution of the sum of e4,500 among persons A, B, and C?
The two versions of the questionnaire differ, explicitly or implicitly, in several
respects. First, the status of the differences between the claims of the three individuals
is different. In the Firm version, these differences are agreed upon by the three firm
owners, while in the Pensions version they are explained by contributions in the past of
the three pensioners and hence by wage differences during the active career. Therefore,
in the Firm version respondents are likely to interpret the differences between claims
to be caused more by desert and less by talent than in the Pensions version. Second,
the two versions of the questionnaire differ with respect to the relation between the
claims or awards and the ultimate outcomes relevant to the three individuals. In the
Firm version it is specified that the individuals have also other sources of income. In
the Pensions version on the other hand, it is likely that respondents view the pension
amounts as very important, perhaps even the only, sources of income of the three
individuals. Finally, the scope of the decision is different in the two versions of the
questionnaire. Whereas in the Firm version awards pertain only to one monthly pay, in
the Pensions version payments are implied to be determined by the decision for much
longer.
Questions were presented in series of three: with the long introductions given above
for the first of the three questions and shorter introductions for the second and third.
After each series of three questions, respondents were encouraged to provide written
comments on their choices. The questionnaire was anonymous. In order to test for
order effects, we used several variants of the questionnaire with different orders of the
questions and different orders of the alternatives. There were no significant differences
between these alternative variants, and we therefore pooled all the data.
The questionnaire was conducted among the first year undergraduate economics
and business students of the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, in May 2005,
and among graduate economics and business students of the University of Osnabrück,
Germany, in November 2005. None of the students had already been exposed to the
theory of claims problems in their study programs. In the course of 1 week, the ques-
tionnaires were filled in by the students at the start of several exercise sessions. In
each session, roughly half of the students participated in the Firm version of the
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Table 2 Sample sizes Belgium Germany All
Firm 123 153 276
Pensions 118 154 272
questionnaire, and the other half in the Pensions version. The sample sizes are given
in Table 2.
4 Results
4.1 A first look
Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 report the percentages of the respondents who
chose each of the alternative awards vectors in questions 1–9. Results are given for
the Belgian (B) and German (G) samples separately, as well as for the pooled sample
Table 3 Question 1, c= (1,500, 2,000, 2,500) and E=4,500
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA, CE (1,500, 1,500, 1,500) 4 5 4 4 2 3
Pin (1,250, 1,500, 1,750) 12 14 13 21 16 18
Total 16 19 17 25 18 21
Neutral P (1,125, 1,500, 1,875) 55 43 49 46 40 43
Anti-egalitarian (1,050, 1,500, 1,950) 2 2 2 7 5 6
CEL, T, RA, MO (1,000, 1,500,2,000) 27 34 31 22 34 29
Total 29 36 33 29 39 35
Table 4 Question 2, c= (1,500, 2,000, 2,500) and E=3,000
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA (1,000, 1,000, 1,000) 2 5 4 5 5 5
(850, 1,000, 1,150) 14 7 10 22 13 17
Total 16 12 14 27 18 22
Neutral P, T, CE, Pin, RA (750, 1,000, 1,250) 58 56 57 47 56 52
Anti-egalitarian (650, 1,000, 1,350) 7 7 7 12 9 10
CEL, MO (500, 1,000, 1,500) 20 24 22 14 16 15
Total 27 31 29 26 25 25
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Table 5 Question 3, c= (1,500, 2,000, 2,500) and E=1,500
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA, T, CE, Pin, RA, MO (500, 500, 500) 9 5 7 11 16 14
(450, 500, 550) 9 9 9 24 14 18
Total 18 14 16 36 30 32
Neutral P (375, 500, 625) 59 50 54 44 42 43
Anti-egalitarian (250, 500, 750) 21 27 24 16 24 20
CEL (0, 500, 1,000) 3 7 5 3 3 3
Total 24 34 29 19 27 23
Table 6 Question 4, c= (1,000, 2,000, 3,000) and E=4,500
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA, CE (1,000, 1,750, 1,750) 1 2 2 0 1 0
Pin (1,000, 1,500, 2,000) 11 13 12 17 16 17
Total 12 15 14 17 17 17
Neutral P (750, 1,500, 2,250) 73 58 65 64 64 64
Anti-egalitarian RA (666, 1,416, 2,416) 4 4 4 5 6 6
CEL, T, MO (500, 1,500, 2,500) 11 20 16 14 12 13
Total 15 24 20 19 18 19
Table 7 Question 5, c= (1,000, 2,000, 3,000) and E=3,000
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA (1,000, 1,000, 1,000) 2 1 1 3 3 3
(700, 1,000, 1,300) 14 10 12 24 19 21
Total 16 11 13 27 22 24
Neutral P, T, CE, Pin, RA (500, 1,000, 1,500) 73 72 73 61 69 66
Anti-egalitarian MO (333, 833, 1,833) 9 8 8 9 6 7
CEL (0, 1,000, 2,000) 2 6 4 3 1 2
Total 11 14 12 12 7 9
(All). Recall that the awards vectors appear in sequence of increasing inequality (in
the Lorenz sense). We have distinguished three sets of alternatives in the tables. First,
the neutral awards vector is the one consistent with the proportional rule. Second, the
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Table 8 Question 6, c= (1,000, 2,000, 3,000) and E=1,500
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA, T, CE, Pin (500, 500, 500) 11 5 8 14 19 17
MO, RA (333, 583, 583) 4 2 3 17 9 12
Total 15 7 11 31 28 29
Neutral P (250, 500, 750) 70 70 70 58 53 55
Anti-egalitarian (150, 500, 850) 12 14 13 8 11 9
CEL (0, 250, 1,250) 3 5 4 2 2 2
Total 15 19 17 10 13 11
Table 9 Question 7, c= (500, 2,000, 3,500) and E=4,500
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA, CE (500, 2,000, 2,000) 3 3 3 5 4 4
Pin (500, 1,625, 2,375) 10 7 8 18 25 22
(450, 1,600, 2,450) 2 4 3 12 10 11
(400, 1,500, 2,600) 12 11 11 13 9 10
Total 27 25 25 48 48 47
Neutral P (375, 1,500, 2,625) 48 47 48 34 29 31
Anti-egalitarian RA (333, 1,333, 2,833) 3 6 5 7 6 6
T (250, 1,375, 2,875) 12 9 10 6 7 6
MO (166, 1,416, 2,916) 7 5 6 2 5 3
CEL (0, 1,500, 3,000) 4 5 4 2 3 2
Total 26 25 25 17 21 17
awards vectors that Lorenz dominate the neutral solution are referred to as egalitarian.
Third, the anti-egalitarian awards vectors are the ones that are Lorenz dominated by
the neutral solution. The tables also report which rules are consistent with each of the
alternative awards vectors.
The results are very similar for Belgium and Germany. The χ2 tests in the first nine
rows of Table 12 test, for each question separately, the null hypothesis that the popu-
lation proportions for the categories egalitarian, neutral, and anti-egalitarian, respec-
tively, are equal for Belgium and Germany. The test in the last row does the same
for the complete set of questions, i.e., for 27 (3 × 9) categories. The evidence clearly
supports the null hypothesis. Therefore, we will discuss the pooled data in this sub-
section. Given the small differences in the characteristics of the Belgian and German
samples, significant differences between the results would have been rather worrying.
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Table 10 Question 8, c= (500, 2,000, 3,500) and E=3,000
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA (500, 1,250, 1,250) 6 4 5 17 12 14
(350, 1,100, 1,550) 13 8 10 30 23 26
Total 19 12 15 47 35 40
Neutral P, T, CE, Pin, RA (250, 1,000, 1,750) 67 72 70 44 43 44
Anti-egalitarian MO (166, 916, 1,916) 9 7 8 4 7 6
CEL (0, 750, 2,250) 3 5 4 2 1 2
Total 12 12 12 6 8 8
Table 11 Question 9, c= (500, 2,000, 3,500) and E=1,500
Rule(s) Awards vector Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA (500, 500, 500) 4 3 4 17 17 17
T, CE, Pin (250, 625, 625) 6 3 4 16 8 12
MO, RA (166, 666, 666) 5 0 2 3 3 3
Total 15 6 10 36 28 32
Neutral P (125, 500, 875) 62 64 63 46 42 43
Anti-egalitarian (100, 450, 950) 9 12 11 6 9 7
(50, 450, 1,000) 8 9 9 3 9 6
CEL (0, 0, 1,500) 4 4 4 3 3 3
Total 21 25 24 12 21 16
The support for the null hypothesis is a reassuring indication that our questionnaire
method leads to robust findings.
We first focus on the question of between-context uniformity, i.e., on the differ-
ences between the results obtained with the two versions of the questionnaire. Overall,
responses are less egalitarian in the Firm version than in the Pensions version. In all
nine questions, the percentage of the respondents that chose egalitarian awards vec-
tors is lower in the Firm version than in the Pensions version, and in eight out of
nine questions the percentage that chose anti-egalitarian awards vectors is higher in
the Firm version than in the Pensions version. The first nine rows of Table 13 test,
for each question separately, the null hypothesis that the population proportions for
the categories egalitarian, neutral, and anti-egalitarian, respectively, are equal for the
two questionnaire versions, and the last row does the same for the complete set of
questions. Table 13 confirms that responses are significantly different for the two ver-
sions. The evidence that respondents chose less egalitarian alternatives in the Firm
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Table 12 Homogeneity of
Belgian and German results, p











All questions 0.350 0.726
Table 13 Homogeneity of firm
and pensions versions, p values
for χ2 tests
Question Belgium Germany All
1 0.172 0.810 0.308
2 0.095 0.252 0.047
3 0.010 0.003 0.000
4 0.287 0.304 0.417
5 0.074 0.011 0.002
6 0.007 0.000 0.000
7 0.002 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.000
All questions 0.000 0.000 0.000
version than in the Pensions version is particularly strong in the case of questions 3, 6,
7, 8, and 9. Note that in each of these questions the majority of the alternative award
vectors feature incomes lower than e500, an amount close to the minimally guar-
anteed income in Belgium and Germany. The fact that respondents in the Pensions
version are especially egalitarian in these cases, suggests that they may have some
concern for a minimum level of income being respected—in fact, this concern was
expressed explicitly by several respondents in the comments box of the questionnaire.
Put differently, for low awards, considerations with respect to needs appear to over-
ride considerations with respect to claims. It is interesting to note that the evidence
suggests that the reason why respondents choose more egalitarian alternatives in the
Pensions version is not because they favour equality in itself, but rather because they
want to make sure individuals get a sufficient amount of income. We will return to the
interpretation of these results in Sect. 4.4.
The aggregate data given in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 are not suitable for
examining within-context consistency, i.e., for evaluating the degree to which rules are
successful in describing the choices of the respondents. It is inherent in the definition
of a rule that it proposes an awards vector for every claims problem. Hence, to evalu-
ate the acceptance of a given rule, we need to look at the entire response patterns
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of individual respondents, not just at overall mean responses. However, one first
impression on the basis of the aggregate data is worth mentioning. The awards vec-
tors consistent with the proportional rule perform very well in explaining responses:
they are convincingly most popular in every question. Although this is true for both
versions of the questionnaire, it is even more outspoken in the Firm version than in the
Pensions version. Note that, both for the Firm version and for the Pensions version,
the proportional rule is especially popular in questions 4, 5, and 6 where the claims
vector is (1,000, 2,000, 3,000). It is hard to find an economic explanation for this
observation—perhaps it is simply due to the fact that, for the given claims vector, the
awards vectors of the proportional rule are particularly easy to calculate.
In the next subsection, we will provide a more robust analysis based on individual-
level data to compare the empirical performance of the various rules. Before moving
on, however, we discuss two basic intuitions of the respondents that are revealed in
the aggregate data for both versions of the questionnaire: concerns for strict order
preservation and nonzero awards. Both of these concerns were also stated explicitly
in comments by several respondents.
Respondents in both questionnaire versions seem to want the order in claims to be
preserved strictly in awards. Alternatives in which individuals with different claims
get equal awards only appear in the sets of egalitarian awards vectors of the questions.
For all questions in which alternatives are available in the set of egalitarian awards
vectors that respect strict order preservation (this is the case in all questions except 6
and 9), the awards vector that violates strict order preservation is least popular among
the egalitarian awards vectors for both questionnaire versions. Since the constrained
equal awards rule never respects strict order preservation for the claims problems in
our questionnaire, its awards vectors perform rather badly in describing respondents’
choices.
There is a reluctance among respondents in both questionnaire versions to give an
individual a zero award. Awards vectors in which an individual gets a zero award only
appear as the least egalitarian alternative in the set of anti-egalitarian awards vectors
of the questions. In all questions in which such an alternative is present (all questions
except 1, 2, and 4), it is least popular among the anti-egalitarian awards vectors for
both versions of the questionnaire. This is particularly relevant to explain the limited
success of the constrained equal losses rule, which always selects the awards vector
with zero awards in these cases. At the same time, in the questions in which the con-
strained equal losses rule gives everyone strictly more than zero (questions 1, 2, and
4), its awards vectors are most popular in the set of anti-egalitarian solutions.
4.2 A comparison of rules
Strictly speaking, a respondent is consistent with a rule only if she chooses the awards
vectors implied by the rule in all questions. Due to the relatively high number of
questions in the questionnaire, this test is rather demanding. Nevertheless, as Table 14
shows, substantial numbers of respondents were consistent with the proportional rule
in all nine questions for both questionnaire versions. Given this good performance, it
is not surprising that respondents often mentioned in their comments that they were
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Table 14 Percentages of
consistency with rules Rule Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
P 38 33 36 20 19 19
CEA 0 0 0 0 0 0
CEL 2 3 2 2 1 1
T 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pin 0 0 0 0 0 0
CE 0 0 0 0 0 0
RA 0 0 0 0 0 0
MO 0 0 0 0 0 0
applying a proportional procedure throughout the questionnaire. The only other rule
that respondents have chosen consistently with in all nine questions is the constrained
equal losses rule: however, this is the case only for very low numbers of respondents
in each of the two versions of the questionnaire. Our finding concerning the dominat-
ing position of the proportional rule is in line with the questionnaire results of Béhue
(2003), Gächter and Riedl (2006), and Herrero et al. (2006).
Yet, Table 14 also shows that the largest fraction of the respondents (about 60% in
the Firm version and about 80% in the Pensions version) give responses that are not
fully consistent with any of the rules that have been proposed in the theoretical litera-
ture. In some cases, this may be due to calculation or rounding errors. It is more likely,
however, that the ethical intuitions of the respondents vary with the characteristics of
the problem in a way which is not captured by any of the rules. This will be analysed
in more detail in the next subsection. Still, as a first intuitive approach, it is informative
to see how well the answers of the respondents can be approximated by the different
rules. One possibility to measure this is to use the following concept of “distance”.
Let (c, E) be the claims problem used in question  = 1, 2, . . . , 9 and denote the
awards vector chosen by respondent k in question  by Ak(c, E). We define the dis-





i=1 |Aki (c, E) − Ri (c, E)|, i.e., as the total money amount that
respondent k deviates from what is prescribed by rule R.11 If a respondent chooses
consistently according to rule R, then the distance for R is zero. More generally, the
lower the distance, the better the performance of the rule in describing the choices of
the given respondent. For each individual, we then consider her response behaviour
to be “closest” to a rule if the corresponding distance is smallest. Note that these dis-
tances unavoidably depend on the award vectors that we offered as alternatives to the
respondents. However, this bias is limited since the alternative award vectors for each
question are quite evenly spaced.
Table 15 presents, for each rule, the percentages of the respondents for whom the
rule is ranked first, i.e., for whom the distance to the given rule is lower than that to each
11 Gächter and Riedl (2006) consider the differences between observed and theoretical awards vectors for
a two-claimant problem. Our distance measure is a natural generalization of their approach to response
patterns over several questions and to problems with more than two claimants.
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Table 15 Percentages of lowest distances to award vectors of rules
Rule Firm Pensions
B G All B G All
Egalitarian CEA 2 1 2 4 3 4
CE 1 1 1 0 0 0
Pin 6 5 5 23 16 19
Neutral or ambiguous P 75 68 71 58 55 56
T 2 5 4 2 2 2
RA 6 12 9 5 20 14
MO 6 5 5 6 3 4
Anti-egalitarian CEL 2 5 4 3 1 2
other rule. The categories are defined in accordance with Fig. 1. As before, the category
neutral refers to the proportional rule. The category egalitarian includes the rules that
always select award vectors that are at most as unequal as the proportional division.
The category anti-egalitarian includes the rules that always select award vectors that
are at least as unequal as the proportional division. A rule is categorized as ambiguous
if it does not belong to any of the other three categories. For the Firm version, the
proportional rule clearly performs best. Of the other rules, the random arrival rule
stands out somewhat in the German sample, but not in the Belgian sample. For the
Pensions version, the proportional rule also comes out first, but less overwhelmingly
so: Piniles’ rule and, in the German sample, the random arrival rule also perform
well. It is remarkable that Piniles’ rule and the random arrival rule outperform the
prominent constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules. As suggested
before, this may be linked to the concern for strict order preservation and to the reluc-
tance to award zero amounts. Table 15 also confirms the conclusion with respect to
the differences between the two questionnaire versions that was stated in the previous
subsection: egalitarian rules do better in the Pensions version.
4.3 Variations in degree of egalitarianism
In the previous subsection, we studied the question of within-context consistency, i.e.,
whether respondents use the same rule for each claims problem. Here, we consider a
similar question but in terms of progressivity. We examine whether respondents take,
for each claims problem, the same position with respect to progressivity, or whether
they vary their position in a straightforward manner depending on the characteristics
of the claims problem at hand. Specifically, we analyse whether there is a meaningful
pattern to be found under two basic variations of the claims problem: (a) a decrease
of the amount to divide while the claims remain the same, and (b) an increase in the
inequality of the claims vector while the amount to divide remains the same.
In Table 16, the response patterns over the combinations of questions relevant for
question (a) are summarized (in percentages). The category same covers the response
patterns consistent with the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, or
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Table 16 Evolution of progressivity as the amount to divide decreases
Questions Context Same Decrease Increase Decrease–increase Increase–decrease
P CEA CEL
Belgium
1, 2, 3 Firm 45 2 2 3 (0.998) 22 (0.000) 9 (0.923) 4 (1.000)
Pensions 29 2 2 9 (0.872) 26 (0.000) 6 (1.000) 3 (1.000)
4, 5, 6 Firm 55 0 2 8 (0.471) 16 (0.000) 2 (1.000) 7 (0.962)
Pensions 39 0 2 6 (0.978) 21 (0.000) 2 (1.000) 5 (1.000)
7, 8, 9 Firm 43 1 2 11 (0.106) 10 (0.179) 2 (1.000) 10 (0.952)
Pensions 25 3 2 7 (0.881) 15 (0.025) 4 (1.000) 11 (0.990)
Germany
1, 2, 3 Firm 37 2 4 7 (0.929) 25 (0.000) 5 (1.000) 7 (0.999)
Pensions 26 1 3 7 (0.996) 34 (0.000) 7 (1.000) 6 (1.000)
4, 5, 6 Firm 48 0 5 10 (0.289) 14 (0.012) 1 (1.000) 5 (1.000)
Pensions 36 0 1 8 (0.890) 24 (0.000) 3 (1.000) 7 (0.999)
7, 8, 9 Firm 40 0 3 17 (0.000) 11 (0.114) 2 (1.000) 9 (0.989)
Pensions 20 1 1 10 (0.546) 15 (0.047) 1 (1.000) 10 (1.000)
the constrained equal losses rule, i.e., the patterns in which the degree of progres-
sivity remains unchanged. The other four categories—decrease, increase, decrease–
increase, and increase–decrease—describe simple variations in progressivity, and are
also defined using the three prominent rules as benchmark cases. To give an example:
a response pattern over questions 1, 2, and 3 which is consistent with the constrained
equal awards rule in question 1, consistent with the proportional rule in question 2 and
consistent with the constrained equal losses rule in question 3, would be categorized
under decrease. A complete description of the response patterns belonging to each of
the categories is given in Appendix B. The conclusions of this subsection are qualita-
tively the same for the Belgian and German samples: because, as a consequence, the
results for the pooled sample do not provide additional insights, we do not give these
in the tables.
The category same performs best empirically, a result that can be ascribed to the
popularity of the proportional rule. It is more interesting to examine how well the
various other categories perform in describing the choices of those respondents not
consistent with the same category. Therefore, Table 16 provides p values for the null
hypothesis that the population proportion for each of the given categories is equal
to what it would be if choices of respondents not consistent with the same category
were completely random.12 We find that, for both versions of the questionnaire, the
category increase, describing an increase in progressivity as the amount to divide
decreases, performs well empirically, whereas all other categories fail. The popular-
ity of the increase category is consistent with the observation made in Sect. 4.1 that
12 The p values are for the one sided exact test based on the binomial distribution.
123
550 K. Bosmans, E. Schokkaert
Table 17 Evolution of progressivity as claims inequality increases
Questions Context Same Decrease Increase Decrease–increase Increase–decrease
P CEA CEL
Belgium
1, 4, 7 Firm 42 0 2 11 (0.242) 22 (0.000) 8 (0.988) 7 (0.998)
Pensions 21 0 2 8 (0.908) 34 (0.000) 13 (0.983) 3 (1.000)
2, 5, 8 Firm 49 2 2 3 (0.996) 17 (0.001) 2 (1.000) 7 (0.966)
Pensions 30 1 2 3 (1.000) 26 (0.000) 9 (0.994) 2 (1.000)
3, 6, 9 Firm 48 4 2 11 (0.106) 8 (0.414) 2 (1.000) 7 (0.957)
Pensions 34 8 2 5 (0.972) 18 (0.002) 5 (1.000) 3 (1.000)
Germany
1, 4, 7 Firm 35 1 4 4 (0.997) 26 (0.000) 6 (1.000) 7 (1.000)
Pensions 21 0 1 5 (0.998) 32 (0.000) 10 (0.999) 7 (1.000)
2, 5, 8 Firm 48 0 5 7 (0.856) 20 (0.000) 2 (1.000) 4 (1.000)
Pensions 30 1 1 3 (1.000) 25 (0.000) 7 (1.000) 6 (1.000)
3, 6, 9 Firm 42 2 4 9 (0.512) 11 (0.125) 3 (1.000) 9 (0.946)
Pensions 26 12 2 10 (0.428) 14 (0.037) 1 (1.000) 8 (0.996)
respondents seem to attribute importance to minimal income needs. What is interest-
ing is that this pattern appears to be present not only for the Pensions version of the
questionnaire, but also for the Firm version, albeit in a somewhat weaker form.
Table 17 presents similar results as Table 16 but for question (b), i.e., for an increase
in the inequality of the claims vector while keeping the amount to divide constant. As
before, the same consistent patterns perform very well. The question that again arises
is how the other categories perform in describing the choices of the respondents who
are not consistent with this category. The table shows that, for both the Firm version
and the Pensions version, the increase category, describing an increase in progressiv-
ity as claims inequality increases, performs very well empirically, whereas all other
categories fail.13 A similar pattern was found by Gächter and Riedl (2006) on the
basis of results for two questions. The good performance of the increase category may
again be seen as an indication of the importance of minimal income needs: as claims
inequality increases, the claim of the individual with the lowest claim decreases, so
that an increase in progressivity is required in order to ensure a minimal amount for
the individual in question.
The pattern of increasing progressivity in the cases of decreasing amount to divide
or increasing claims inequality is striking. It seems worthwhile to work out the theo-
retical consequences of this idea.
13 Note that the increase category is less popular for the combination of questions 3, 6, and 9. In the Pen-
sions version, however, the popularity of the constrained equal awards rule (in the same category) for this
combination is remarkable. Since the constrained equal awards rule is the most progressive rule possible,
its good performance is to the disadvantage of the increase category.
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4.4 Acquired rights and claims problems in the real world
It is of course impossible to draw strong policy conclusions from the answers on
highly stylized questions that abstract completely from possibly crucial institutional
features. In this respect our results are complementary to those derived from more
policy oriented questionnaires, as exemplified in Boeri et al. (2001, 2002). Contrary
to the simplified problems in our setting, that certainly put the respondents in a kind of
straightjacket, broader opinion surveys have the advantage of integrating the ethical
issues in a more realistic background. To give an example, for the pensions problem
it is worthwhile, perhaps even necessary, to compare the attitudes towards decreasing
benefits (on which we focus in our stylized questions) with the attitudes towards
increasing contributions or delaying retirement. On the other hand, introducing such
a richer and more realistic institutional background makes it more difficult to focus
in detail on more complicated specific issues. The precise structure of desired ben-
efit (or earnings) reductions can only be made operational through a series of rather
abstract questions and it is not obvious how to integrate such abstract questions in a
broader survey. More importantly, real-world opinions reflect a mixture of self-interest
and fairness considerations and the relative importance of both components may be
different for different respondents. This makes it extremely difficult to derive from
these opinions a specific view on fairness ideas as such. Yet from a theoretical point
of view, distinguishing self-interest and fairness considerations is certainly useful to
get a better understanding of the reasons for differences and similarities in individual
behaviour.
Let us now, with these caveats in mind, cautiously formulate some general con-
clusions on real-world issues that we can draw from our questionnaire results. In the
first place, our results confirm that feelings about being treated in a fair way may play
a crucial role in the psychological acceptability of different distributions. One may
indeed hypothesize that both the requirement that the order in claims is preserved
strictly in the awards and the requirement that no individual should get a zero award,
express deep psychological feelings about a minimum level of respect for acquired
rights. Note that in our setting these concerns were expressed (implicitly) by observers
who are not themselves directly involved in the distributional conflict.
In the second place, the dominating position of the proportional rule is striking and
is certainly in line with everyday practice. It turns out, however, that the popularity
of more progressive rules increases if the distribution problem gets more “difficult”,
in that either the amount to divide decreases or the inequality in the initial claims
increases. In general, this suggests that an overall perspective on inequality plays a
role in the evaluation of different solutions. More particularly, our findings may express
a specific concern for the weakest groups, even in the firm setting where the claims are
closely linked to productive contributions and have been agreed upon by the parties
concerned.
In the third place, mainly in the pensions problem, we recover the popularity of
the idea of a “minimum floor” in the distribution. This idea is described by Elster
(1992) as an integral part of the commonsense conception of justice. It came also out
strongly in the experiments of Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992). At the same time,
however, even in the pensions case responses were dominated by the proportional
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rule. Our respondents overall do not express a strongly egalitarian view on pensions.
Perhaps we should not exaggerate the importance of this finding. It may be caused
by the general setting of the questionnaire, by which the attention of the respondents
was directed towards differences in contributions and not, e.g., towards differences
in needs. It may also be influenced by the fact that both our samples come from
countries with a traditionally Bismarckian type of pension system, where benefits are
indeed linked to contributions. More research is needed to distinguish these different
interpretations.
This last issue suggests that it would be an interesting research topic to con-
front questionnaire results with actual decisions and institutions in different countries.
Especially fruitful could be a deeper empirical study of the actual legal rules that have
been implemented in different countries to solve real-world claims problems. These
legal rules are generic and introduced in order to settle future distributional conflicts.
They are set by political players who have no direct stakes in these future conflicts.
It can therefore be expected that legal rules reflect, more than actual decisions in an
unregulated environment, the prevailing fairness opinions in society.
5 Conclusion
We discussed in this paper the results of a questionnaire study concerning claims
problems among Belgian and German students. The results are robust over the two
samples. Two versions of the questionnaire were considered—the Firm version and
the Pensions version—in which the same claims problems were presented in dif-
ferent economic contexts. The questionnaire setup allowed us to consider (1) the
question of within-context consistency, i.e., the degree to which respondents apply
the same rule for different claims problems in the same economic context, and (2)
the question of between-context uniformity, i.e., the degree to which respondents
propose the same awards vector for the same claims problem in different economic
contexts.
To start with the latter question: responses were clearly more egalitarian in the
Pensions version of the questionnaire than in the Firm version. We suggested that this
phenomenon could be due to the fact that the Pensions context induced respondents
to give more weight to respect for basic needs in the choice of awards vectors. The
finding that the distributions chosen in different claims problems are dependent on the
economic context of the problem is not new. From a theoretical point of view, it raises
the difficult challenge of the construction of a kind of meta-theory that would give a
formal structure to the relationship between the characteristics of the economic envi-
ronment and the choice of a specific rule. Considerations of personal responsibility
and differential needs will certainly play an important role here.
With regard to the question of within-context consistency, we found that the pro-
portional rule performed very well in describing the choices of the respondents in both
versions of the questionnaire. The other two rules that play a prominent role in the
literature, viz., the constrained equal losses and constrained equal awards rules, fail
to capture basic intuitions of the respondents. Respondents were reluctant to give a
zero award to an individual with a nonzero claim. The constrained equal losses rule is
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the only of the eight considered rules that violates this property.14 Respondents also
seemed to prefer to give a strictly higher award to an individual with a strictly higher
claim. The constrained equal awards rule in many problems gives equal awards to
individuals with different claims. With the notable exception of the proportional rule,
all rules we considered violate this property in some cases, but not in as many cases as
the constrained equal awards rule.15 Our results suggest that respondents are applying
lower bounds on differences between awards, and it may be interesting to study such
lower bounds formally.
We also considered the question of within-context consistency from the inequality
perspective. The questionnaire design allowed us to examine variations in the tol-
erance of inequality of the respondents under simple changes of the characteristics
of the claims problem. Of those respondents who did not adopt a uniform attitude
towards inequality in all claims problems, a substantial percentage tend to become
more progressive as the amount to divide decreases other things equal, and tend to
become more progressive as the inequality of the claims vector increases other things
equal. We see this result as an encouragement to document for each important rule
how it behaves in terms of inequality under such simple changes of the characteris-
tics of the claims problem. Such ideas are useful in organizing empirical intuitions
concerning claims problems, but have remained largely unexamined in the theoretical
literature.16
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mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix A: Definitions of rules
We present formal definitions of the Talmud, Piniles’, constrained egalitarian, random
arrival, and minimal overlap rules.
The Talmud rule was proposed by Aumann and Maschler (1985) in order to rational-
ize examples found in the Babylonian Talmud. The rule attaches particular importance
to the relative positions of the amount to divide E and the sum of the half-claims C/2.
If E = C/2, then each individual receives her half-claim. If E < C/2, then the rule
focuses on awards: it equalizes awards under the constraint that no individual receives
an award that is greater than her half-claim. If E > C/2, then the rule focuses on
losses: it equalizes losses under the constraint that no individual receives an award
that is smaller than her half-claim.
14 Recent studies address lower bounds on awards that imply nonzero awards for nonzero claims. An
example is the requirement that no individual receives an award smaller than 1/n times her claim truncated
at the amount to divide (Moreno-Ternero and Villar 2004; Dominguez and Thomson 2006).
15 Young (1988) characterizes a class of rules that satisfy strict order preservation (among other properties)
and contains the proportional rule.
16 An exception is the study of Hougaard and Østerdal (2005), which concerns the behaviour of the pro-
portional rule under variations of the inequality of the claims vector. Several recent studies address other
distributional aspects of rules: see the references in Sect. 2.
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Talmud rule, T. For all (c, E) ∈ C , we have that
(i) if E ≤ C/2, then T (c, E) = CEA ( 12 c, E
)
,
(ii) if E ≥ C/2, then T (c, E) = 12 c + CEL
( 1
2 c, E − 12 C
)
.
Typical awards vectors for the Talmud rule are ( 12 c1,
1
2 c2, . . . ,
1
2 ck, λ, λ, . . . , λ) if
E ≤ C/2, and ( 12 c1, 12 c2, . . . , 12 ck, ck+1 − λ, ck+2 − λ, . . . , cn − λ) if E ≥ C/2.
Piniles’ rule and the constrained egalitarian rule coincide with the Talmud rule
whenever E ≤ C/2. Contrary to the Talmud rule, both rules focus on equality of
awards if E > C/2. Piniles’ rule was introduced by Piniles (1861) in an early attempt
to rationalize the numbers appearing in the Talmud. If E > C/2, then the rule first gives
each individual her half-claim. The remainder is divided equally under the constraint
that no individual receives an award that exceeds her claim.
Piniles’ rule, Pin. For all (c, E) ∈ C , we have that
(i) if E ≤ C/2, then Pin(c, E) = T (c, E) = CEA ( 12 c, E
)
,
(ii) if E ≥ C/2, then Pin(c, E) = 12 c + CEA
( 1
2 c, E − 12 C
)
.
If E > C/2, then (c1, c2, . . . , ck, 12 ck+1 + λ, 12 ck+2 + λ, . . . , 12 cn + λ) is a typical
awards vector for Piniles’ rule.
The constrained egalitarian rule was proposed by Chun et al. (2001) who took as
their inspiration the uniform rule (Sprumont 1991). If E > C/2, then the rule equal-
izes awards under the constraint that no individual receives an award smaller than her
half-claim or greater than her claim.
Constrained egalitarian rule, CE. For all (c, E) ∈ C , we have that
(i) if E ≤ C/2, then CE(c, E) = T (c, E) = CEA ( 12 c, E
)
,
(ii) if E ≥ C/2, then, for all i ∈ N , we have CEi (c, E) = max
{
ci
2 , min {ci , λ}
}
where λ ∈ R+ is chosen so as to achieve efficiency.
If E > C/2, then (c1, c2, . . . , ck, λ, λ, . . . , λ, 12 c,
1
2 c+1, . . . ,
1
2 cn) is a typical
awards vector for the constrained egalitarian rule.
The final two rules, both introduced in a pioneering paper by O’Neill (1982), coin-
cide with the Talmud rule in the case of two claimants. The random arrival rule is
closely related to the Shapley value. To define this rule, assume the individuals arrive
one by one, each receiving full compensation until the money runs out. By averaging
the awards vectors obtained in this way over all possible orders of arrival, we get
the division recommended by the random arrival rule. Let N denote the class of all
permutations of N .
Random arrival rule, RA. For all (c, E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N , we have























The minimal overlap rule is an extension of a proposal by Ibn Ezra in the twelfth
century (O’Neill 1982; Chun and Thomson 2005; Alcalde et al. 2008). To understand
123
Equality preference in the claims problem 555
the rule, regard each individual i as claiming the part [0, ci ] of the interval [0, E].
The rule distinguishes two cases. (i) In the case where there exists an individual with
a claim at least as great as the amount to divide, all claims are first truncated by the
amount available. Next, each part of [0, E] is divided equally among all individuals
claiming it. For instance, the interval [0, c1] is claimed by everyone, and so everyone
gets c1/n. The interval (c1, c2] is claimed by everyone except individual 1, and so each
member of N − {1} receives in addition (c2 − c1)/(n − 1). This process continues
until the entire interval [0, E] is covered. (ii) In the case where all individuals have
claims smaller than the amount to divide, one lets c0 = 0 and looks for the largest k∗
in {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 2} for which there exists a t ∈ R+ that satisfies
ck∗ < t ≤ ck∗+1 and (ck∗+1 − t) + (ck∗+2 − t) + · · · + (cn − t) = E − t .17 (1)
Each individual i in the set {k∗ + 1, k∗ + 2, . . . , n} receives a first share equal to
ci − t , i.e., the part of the interval (t, E] that i alone claims. The remaining part [0, t]
is divided as in case (i) with t as the amount to divide. For the definition, we follow
Chun and Thomson (2005, p. 138).
Minimal overlap rule, MO. Let (c, E) ∈ C . We add a dummy, denoted by 0, to the
set of individuals and we put c0 = MO0 = 0. Then, we have the following.
(i) Let ck∗ < E ≤ ck∗+1 ≤ cn with k∗ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. Then,
MOi = c1n + c2−c1n−1 + c3−c2n−1 + · · · + ci −ci−1n−(i−1) for each i = 1, 2, . . . , k∗,
MO j = MOk∗ + E−ck∗n−k∗ for each j = k∗ + 1, k∗ + 2, . . . , n.
(ii) Let cn < E . Let ck∗ < t ≤ ck∗+1 with k∗ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 2} and t as in (1).
Then,
MOi = c1n + c2−c1n−1 + c3−c2n−1 + · · · + ci −ci−1n−(i−1) for each i = 1, 2, . . . , k∗,
MO j = (c j − t) + MOk∗ + t−ck∗n−k∗ for each j = k∗ + 1, k∗ + 2, . . . , n.
Appendix B: Description of categories
Over two questions, the response patterns belonging to the categories same, decrease,
and increase can be defined using the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards
rule, and the constrained equal losses rule as benchmarks.
1. Same progressivity in question x and question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in question x and in ques-
tion y.
(b) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and in question y.
(c) Consistent with the constrained equal losses rule in question x and in
question y.
17 If the claims happen to be feasible, i.e., c1 + c2 + · · · + cn = E , then k∗ = 0 and we allow t = c0 = 0.
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2. Decrease of progressivity from question x to question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in question x and less
progressive than the constrained equal awards rule in question y.
(b) More progressive than the proportional rule in question x and at most as
progressive as the proportional rule in question y.
(c) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and less progressive than
the proportional rule in question y.
(d) Less progressive than the proportional rule but not consistent with the con-
strained equal losses rule in question x and consistent with the constrained
equal losses rule in question y.
3. Increase of progressivity from question x to question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal losses rule in question x and more
progressive than the constrained equal losses rule in question y.
(b) Less progressive than the proportional rule in question x and at least as
progressive as the proportional rule in question y.
(c) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and more progressive than
the proportional rule in question y.
(d) More progressive than the proportional rule but not consistent with the con-
strained equal awards rule in question x and consistent with the constrained
equal awards rule in question y.
Over three questions, the five categories same, decrease, increase, decrease–
increase, and increase–decrease are defined as follows.
1. Same progressivity over questions x, y, z: Same in x and y and same in y and z.
2. Decrease of progressivity over questions x, y, z:
(a) Decrease from x to y and decrease from y to z.
(b) Decrease from x to y and same from y to z.
(c) Same from x to y and decrease from y to z.
3. Increase of progressivity over questions x, y, z:
(a) Increase from x to y and increase from y to z.
(b) Increase from x to y and same from y to z.
(c) Same from x to y and increase from y to z.
4. Decrease–increase of progressivity over questions x, y, z: Decrease from x to y
and increase from y to z.
5. Increase–decrease of progressivity over questions x, y, z: Increase from x to y
and decrease from y to z.
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